Redemption simply means the process by which a mortgage is discharged upon payment of all sums due (see Re Wallis (1890) LR 25 QBD 176 per Fry LJ at 181) and the performance of any other obligations which may legitimately be required (see Brighton & Hove City Council v Audus [2009] EWHC 340 (Ch) per Morgan J at [46]).
The principles involved in redemption, like many others in mortgage law, have tended to become complicated, not least because of the largely historic concepts of the mortgagor’s legal or contractual right to redeem and his equitable right to redeem, and the distinction between the mortgagor’s equitable right to redeem and his equity of redemption (for a detailed analysis see Fisher & Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage, 15th Edition, Chapter 47). In practice, most institutional mortgage deeds no longer stipulate a redemption date, but may stipulate terms upon which the mortgagor may, at any time, redeem the mortgage.
There is no rule in equity which precludes a lender from stipulating for any collateral advantage (additional benefit), provided that the stipulation is not (1) unfair or unconscionable, (2) in the nature of a penalty clogging the equity of redemption or (3) inconsistent with or repugnant to the right to redeem (Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1914] AC 25 at p 61, confirmed in Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995 per Lord Phillips MR at [92] and Brighton & Hove City Council v Audus [2009] EWHC 340 (Ch) per Morgan J at [47]).
Historically these rules have often been described, collectively, as ‘clogs on the equity of redemption’, meaning an objectionable restriction on the rights of the borrower who has mortgaged his property as security for the debt (Warnborough Ltd v Garmite Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1544 per Jonathan Parker LJ at [1] and see the analysis of the authorities at [42] etc), although it may be questioned how far this expression continues to serve any useful purpose (it does not assist in identifying the detail of the relevant rules, see Brighton & Hove City Council v Audus [2009] EWHC 340 (Ch) per Morgan J at [46] and has been described as an appendix to the law which no longer serves a useful purpose and should be excised: Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995 per Lord Phillips MR at [86]. The Law Commission has also proposed the abolition of the equitable jurisdiction to set aside any provision of a mortgage which constitutes a clog or fetter on the equity of redemption: Law Commission – Transfer of Land - Land Mortgages (Law Com. No. 204) (1991).
The rules of equity apply where the stipulation forms part of the contract of mortgage (ie. it forms part of a mortgage or security interest) not where it forms part of a separate transaction. The court will look at the substance of the transaction (see the analysis by Morgan J in Brighton & Hove City Council v Audus [2009] EWHC 340 (Ch) per Morgan J at [50] etc and Warnborough Ltd v Garmite Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1544).
Whether a stipulation is unfair or unconscionable does not simply depend on whether it is unreasonable, but whether it has been imposed in a ‘morally reprehensible’ manner (Cityland and Property (Holdings) Ltd v Dabrah [1968] Ch 166 and Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] Ch 84 – see the analysis in Brighton & Hove City Council v Audus [2009] EWHC 340 (Ch) at [48] etc). The court will consider all the circumstances of the case including the nature and terms of the collateral advantage, the nature of the loan (whether commercial or private), whether there was equality of bargaining power, and whether the borrower obtained independent legal advice.